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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

HEBER D. NELSON, et al,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
)
)
)

vs.
RICHARD STOKER, et al,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 18244

)
)
)
)
)
)

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Defendant, the State of Utah Department of Social Services
and Patricia Kunz, is appealing from a judgment granting Plaintiffsv
Motion for Summary Judgment, which judgment determined the priority
of liens on certain real property located in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court, Honorable G. Hal Taylor, determined the
priority of liens giving first priority to a Trust Deed securing
obligations owing to Western Mortgage Loan Corporation, giving
second priority to the Plaintiffs' Trust Deed securing unpaid
balance of purchase price, granting third priority to a judgment
against Defendant Richard W.

~toker,

granting fourth priority to

Appellant State of Utah Department of Social Services and Patricia
Kunz, and granting fifth priority to Tom Darnell and Diane Truscott,
mortgagees.

Only the Utah Department of Social Services and Patricia

Kunz appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have a priority granted the Utah Department
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of Social Services and Patricia Kunz higher than awarded by the
Court and prior to the second priority granted Respondents'
purchase money Trust Deed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff cannot accept the Statement of Facts as contained
in the brief of Appellant as the Statement does not state the facts
in the light most favorable to the decision made by the District
Court.
The Court made Findings of Fact after the Motion for Summary
Judgment was argued and presented in open court and all parties
appeared before the court.

Plaintiffs filed an Affidavit, which

Affidavit was not contradicted by any party and which is supported
by the documentary evidence examined by the Court at the time the
Motion for Summary Judgment was heard.
The undisputed facts are that on or about the 4th of June,
1979, Plaintiffs and the Defendants Richard W. Stoker and LaNae S.
Stoker entered into an agreement for the purchase by Defendants
Stoker of all of Lot 11, Pioneer Estates No. 3 Subdivision, located
in Salt Lake County.

Plaintiffs deeded by Warranty Deed to the

Stokers the property involved.

This deed is shown by Exhibit 2-P

which was presented to the court and is now in the file.

At the

same time, in payment of the purchase price, Stokers executed and
delivered a Trust Deed, which is Exhibit 3-P, securing the unpaid
purchase price of $8,464.76.

The Warranty Deed and Trust Deed

were recorded.by McGhie Land Title at the same moment as shown by
the filing stamp on the documents, i.e. 12:35 P.M. on June
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The Warranty Deed was subject to a Western Mortgage Loan
Corporation Trust Deed in the face amount of $40,700.00 executed
by Plaintiffs.

Stokers made no downpayment and only one monthly

payment.
The Affidavit of Plaintiff states his opinion that the
property value does not exceed the balance owing on the Western
Morgage Loan Corporation loan and the unpaid balance owing Plaintiff
on the purchase price represented by the Trust Deed, Exhibit 3-P.
On June 5, 1979 Defendant Richard W. Stoker was a judgment
debtor owing a debt to Ray Quintana, dba Silver Way, in the amount
of $1,038.17, costs of $13.80, and an attorney's fee of $350.00,
item #8 on the foreclosure report, Exhibit 1.

Judgment was dated

January 13, 1977 and filed on the 14th of January, 1977.
There was also a judgment against Richard W. Stoker to the
State of Utah Department of Social Services and Patricia Kunz in
the amount of $21,610.00 dated February 23, 1979 and filed on
March 16, 1979.
The Affidavit of Plaintiff further stated that he did not
appreciate the significance of the judgments against his buyer at
the time the Warranty Deed was given Stokers and the Trust Deed
taken back to secure the purchase price, or he did not observe
that these obligations were on the title report supplied to him
by McGhie Land Title.
It is undisputed that the Appellant did not know of the
transaction between the Plaintiffs and Defendants Stoker and did
not have any interest in said transaction, nor did they give any
consideration for an interest in the real property of Defendants
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Affidavit of Heber D. Nelson is pages 28 and 29 of

the Record on Appeal.
The Court made Findings of Fact finding the items as recited
herein that were undisputed and took into consideration the
Affidavit, statement of counsel, foreclosure report on the real
property, the Warranty Deed, and the Trust Deed that are described
(R. 42-43), and found that none of the parties were aware of the
transaction between the Plaintiffs and Defendant Stoker and that
no party had relied upon there being a property interest in Stokers
for extension of credit or in any other way which might have been
detrimental to them.
Based on the Findings of Fact, the Court then determined that
the priority of liens on Lot 11, Pioneer Estates No. 3 Subdivision,
were as tollows:
(1) Priority No. 1 was granted to the Trust Deed, face
amount of $40,700.00, to Western Loan Mortgage Corporation, recorded
March 20, 1978.
(2) It granted second priority to the Trust Deed to Plaintiffs
for $8,464.76 securing the purchase price of the property agreed
upon between Plaintiffs and Defendants Stoker.
(3)

Third priority was granted to Ray Quintana, dba Silver

Way, judgment.
(4) Fourth priority was granted to the State of Utah Department
of Social Services and Patricia Kunz, Appellants, whose judgment
is in the amount of $21,610.00.
(5) Fifth priority was granted to the Defendants Tom Darnell
and Diane Truscott based on the mortgage recorded March 18, 1981.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
NEITHER PARTY TO THE TRANSACTION BETWEEN PLAINTIFFS AND
STOKERS EXPECTED THE APPELLANT TO OBTAIN AN INTEREST IN
THE REAL PROPERTY WITH PRIORITY AHEAD OF PLAINTIFFS.
It is a fundamental principle of equity that no one shall be
allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another by
reason of an innocent mistake of law or fact.

Appellant asks

this Court to give it a priority over the Respondents by reason
of the fact that Respondents and Stoker made a mistake of law or
fact, or both, in placing title in Stoker after the judgment
against him had been entered of record on behalf of Appellant.
It is respectfully submitted that recognizing the position of
Respondents can injure no one and deny to anyone rights that justice
entitles them to.
The equity courts over the years have_ had difficulty relieving
people from mistakes of law since the exact status of

any

particular legal principle is always difficult to ascertain.
However, where the mistake, if it is a mistake of law rather than
a fact, relates to a title situation, courts have universally held
that a party may be relieved of the consequences of his mistake
and granted equitable relief where no person is harmed by such a
resolution.

This Court, in the case of Sine v. Rudy, 27 Utah 2d

67, 493 P.2d 299, recognized that equity would relieve people from
mistaken beliefs as to what the status or legal condition of property
concerned in their transaction actually was.
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The texts seemed to be unanimous in concurring that equity
jurisdiction gives the right to relieve against mistakes, especially
where they are mutual on the part of parties to a transaction.
See 30 C.J.S., §47, pg 868, etc., and 27 Am.Jur.2d, §28, pg 552.
There has been no doubt that the equity court had power to
relieve parties from the consequence of mistakes of fact.

Less

clear has been the proposition that the court would relieve parties
of the consequences of a mistake as to law.

Many of the cases,

however, contain both mistakes as to law and to fact, and in those
cases the courts are able to relieve a party of the mistake where
no one is harmed and a failure to relieve would cause unjust
enrichment.

27 AmJur.2d, §28, pg 552 through §37, pg 560.

A great number of cases support the principle and illustrate
the manner in which equity intervenes to do justice.

One of the

early cases which has been often quoted and cited as good law is
Cherry v. Welsher, 195 Iowa 640, 192 N.W. 149 (1923).

The rule

recited fits the facts before the court in this case:
"This record, however, shows a release of an unsatisfied
incumbrance, and the lien so released will be revived for
the benefit of the party satisfying it. Justice and equity
require that this should be done. When a person through
misapprehension and mistkake of the law parts with or
surrenders a right of property which he would not have
surrendered but for such misapprehension, a court of equity
will grant relief, if it is satisfied that the parties
benefited by the mistake cannot in conscience retain the
benefits or advantages so acquired. Botorff v. Lewis,
121 Iowa 27, 95 N.W. 262; Kerr on Fraud and Mistake,
pp. 398 and 418. A court of equity will not permit a
party to take and enjoy the benefits of ignorance or
mistake of law on the part of another party who knew
and who did not correct. Faxom et al v. Baldwin, 136
Iowa, 519, 114 N.W. 40; 2 Pomeroy, eq.Jur. (3d Ed.}
§§721, 847."
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For similar ruling see also Prudential Insurance Company of
America v. Nuernberger, et al, 135 Neb. 743, 284 N.W. 266.

Cases

which also accept the general proposition cited in Am.Jur. are
Cooper County Bank v. Bank of Bunceton, 221 Mo. 814, 288 S.W. 95,
where the Missouri Supreme Court stated the law in the following
language:
"The remaining point for our consideration is the
question of rescission. It is plaintiff's contention
that a contract entered into under a mutual misconception
of the legal rights of the parties amounting to a mistake
of law is as amenable to rescission as one founded in a
mistake of fact. It is urged that, being an equity case,
where an unconscionable advantage has been gained by a
mere mistake or misapprehension, equity will interfere
in order to prevent intolerable injusticeo"
See also the following cases:

Norard Hosiery Mills, Inc. v.

Orinoko Mills, 416 Penn. 454, 206 A.2d 56;

Peter v. Peter,

343 Ill. 493, 175 N.E. 846; and Garrett v. Reid-Cashion Land &
Cattle Co., 34 Ariz. 245, 270 P. 1044.

The rule granting relief

is set down in the following language:
"The rule that permits relief to one who enters into
a transaction ignorant of his antecedent existing legal
rights is well recognized. It is stated by Pomeroy on
Equity Jurisprudence (3d Ed.) §849, as follows:
'Wherever a person is ignorant or mistaken with respect
to his own antecedent and existing private legal rights,
interests, estates, duties, liabilities, or other
relations either of property or contract, or personal
status, and enters into some transaction the legal scope
and operation of which he correctly apprehends and
understands, for the purpose of affecting such assumed
rights, interests, or relations, or of carrying out such
assumed duties or liabilities, equity will grant its
relief, defensive or affirmative, treating the mistake
as analogous to, if not identical with, a mistake of fact.' "
See also Mitchell v. California-Pacific Title Ins. Co., et al,
248 P. 1035; Barkhausen, et al v. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank

& Trust Co. of Chicago, 3 Ill.2d, 120 N.E.2d 649.
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In the case of S. S. Pierce Co. v. United States, 17 F.Supp.
667, the District Court stated the law and authority supporting
the fundamental legal principle espoused by Respondent:
"While it is often laid down as a general rule that
equity will not relieve against a mistake of law, Bank
of United States v. Daniel, 12 Pet. 32, 9 L.Ed. 989,
the rule is no doubt subject to exceptions. One such
exception arises where an instrument is given under a
mistake as to the antecedent rights of the parties.
In such cases, it is said that equity may give relief,
although that mistake be the result of ignorance of the
most fundamental legal principles. Williston on Contracts,
§1589; Clifton Manufacturing Company v. United States
(C.C.A.4th, 1935) 76 F.(2d) 577; Order of United
Commercial Travelers of America v. McAdam (C.C.A.8th)
125 F. 358; Reggio v. Warren, 297 Mass. 525, 93 N.E. 805,
32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 340, 20 Ann. Cas. 1244; Renard v. Clink,
91 Mich. ~' 51 N.W. 692, 30 AmSt. Rep. 458. The present
case probably falls within this exception. But a further .
qualification must be noted. The power to set aside an
instrument because of mistake is based upon equitable
principles, and is to be exercised only for the purpose
of preventing unjust enrichment."
If the Court accepts the ruling by the trial judge, the end
result will be that the State will get exactly what it had prior
to the transaction between Plaintiffs and Stoker, the parties to
the transaction will be given the exact items they had prior to
the transaction, and no one will be unjustly enriched.

To accept

the proposition that the State can in some way obtain a lien on
premises of Plaintiff a ahead of their second Trust Deed must be
based on a doctrine that the State is entitled to be unjustly
enriched when no other person can claim such rights.

POINT II
STOKER HAD NO PROPERTY ON WHICH THE LIEN FOR
SUPPORT OF HIS CHILDREN COULD ATTACH.
The judicial Code provisions providing for support of minor
children are clear in their provisions.

Section 78-45b-l.1
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clearly states that the resources of responsible parents are to
be appropriated for support of the parents' minor children.
On February 23, 1979, the date of the judgment in favor of
Appellant, Stoker had no interest whatsoever in the real property
subject to the liens in question.

Other than for a momentary

existence, Stoker never had any interest in the real property in
which the Appellant now seeks to have a oien for child support.
Respondents in no way are responsible for the support of
Stoker's children and their property, under the Public Support of
Children provisions, is not property that the State of Utah has
ever claimed should be appropriated for the support of another's
children.

Appellant cites Section 78-45b-9 which provides for

the docketing of the judgment for support provided by the State.
Said provision states as follows:
"When so filed and docketed the award shall constitute
a lien from the time of such docketing upon the real
and personal property of the obliger .... "
Respondents submit that what the Appellant is attempting to
do is to make the award a lien on property owned by Respondents
since giving the lien of the State priority ahead of Respondents'
recorded Trust Deed would take the property of Respondents to pay
the debts of Defendant Stoker.
The decision of the trial court gives the State of Utah
everything that the statutory provisions cited say it is entitled
to.

The basic equity rule that the trial court applied granted

Respondents their property rights.
enrichment of the State of Utah.

The judgment prevented unjust
Stoker never did have any

substantial interest in the real property subject to the liens
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on which priority was determined.

The State is awarded everything

Stoker ever had by the judgment.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court's decision
reached a fair and equitable resolution of the matter at issue.
That this Court should affirm the trial court judgment.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of June, 1982.

KING and PETERSON

DWIGHT L. KING
Attorney for Plaintiffs
and Respondents
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